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Emerson on Plato: 
Literary Philosophy, Dialectic, 
and the Temporality of Thought
Jesse Bailey
Sacred Heart University
Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato.
Emerson, Plato; or The Philosopher
But it is the fault of our rhetoric that we cannot strongly 
state one fact without seeming to belie some other.
Emerson, History
For Emerson, Plato is the quintessential philosopher. I will 
argue that, to the extent that Emerson wanted his essays to 
have philosophical depth, he considered his work to be an 
extension of the work found in Plato’s dialogues. Thus, in his 
relationship to the towering figure of Plato we can discern his 
understanding of the relation between his literary and philo-
sophical endeavors. When we read his comments on Plato, we 
find crystallized what philosophical work Emerson intended his 
essays to accomplish. Hence, the reader must be attentive not 
simply to the explicit content of his essays, but also the dialectic 
form of the essays. As we know from the Phaedrus, and from the 
dialogical nature of his writings, for Plato the techne of rhetoric 
is not merely stating factual propositions, but more important-
ly consists in knowing and guiding the souls of one’s listeners. 
Jesse Bailey is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Sacred Heart Univer-
sity.
Emerson sees 
his work as 
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The same is certainly true of Emerson’s own work. 
I will argue that the dialogical character of Plato’s works 
and the obscurity and tension in much of Emerson’s writings 
arise from a recognition of the fluid and dialectical character 
of living, human thought. Emerson sought to draw the reader 
into participation in his thinking through the superfluity and 
excess of meaning present in his essays—an excess that philo-
sophical commentators on the essays have found madden-
ing, and even the sign of an inferior mind. I will argue that 
Emerson uses language ambiguously in much the way Plato 
constructed his dialogues in order to demand that the reader 
take an active role in the process of thought. For Emerson, 
truly great philosophy has this “literary” quality of semantic 
excess which makes demands of the reader—rather than sim-
ply and clearly stating a position to be memorized.1 Further, I 
will argue that the dialectical structure of their writings was 
necessary for these two thinkers to speak to diverse audiences 
at many different levels of sophistication and philosophical 
development. Their literary style thus reflects their under-
1 This account of how to approach the dialogues is well-attested, but 
certainly not universally acknowledged. This, however, is not the venue to 
fully defend it. On the importance of attention to the “literary” and dramatic 
elements of the dialogues, and of the necessity of allowing oneself to be 
“drawn into” the conversation, see Jacob Klein, who writes, for example: 
“. . . a Platonic dialogue has not taken place if we, the listeners or readers, 
did not actively participate in it.” A Commentary on Plato’s Meno (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 6. In “Plato and Erotic Reciprocity” 
(Classical Antiquity 5, 1986) David Halperin writes: “By its very form, then, the 
Platonic dialogue aspires to engage the reader—by inviting his sympathetic 
identification with the characters and his intellectual participation in their 
discourse—in a give-and-take, a mutual exchange of ideas, an open-ended 
discussion. It seeks, in other words, to awaken eros in the reader—to arouse, 
in particular, his hermeneutic eros, ‘the desire of the text.’ Or rather, since 
literary interpretation is but a means to understanding, and no piece of 
writing in itself is a very serious matter, it would be more accurate to speak of 
hermeneutic eros in Plato’s conception as ‘the desire of the idea implicit in a 
text’—a striving toward something objective. Without such desire or striving 
or ‘(counter-)love,’ without participating in such a reciprocal exchange, the 
reader will not be able to interpret a Platonic dialogue and will find it baffling, 
pointless, incomprehensible” (69). See also John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading 
the Platonic Dialogues, 3rd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996); Eva Brann, The Music of the Republic: Essays on Socrates’ Conversations 
and Plato’s Writings (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2004), as well as the works 
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standing of the temporality of the philosophical life. These two 
thinkers composed these great works of literary philosophy 
not in order to establish abstract doctrines or systems of 
thought; rather, they wrote in order to invigorate the soul to 
strive toward truth and virtue. 
I also have a secondary purpose in writing this paper: 
Emerson mentions Plato very frequently in his works. It 
seems to be the case that, for many readers, the invocation of 
Plato’s name signals a movement to the transcendental, to “The 
Forms” and the eternal and unchanging. In this paper, I will 
argue that, for Emerson, Plato was a far more complicated fig-
ure than is captured in this reading. 
Despite these frequent references to Plato, both in his pub-
lished works and throughout his journals, I will be focusing 
very narrowly on his essay on Plato in Representative Men, 
because it is here that Emerson’s relation to the complicated 
nature of the figure of Plato is most clear. 
I
Emerson begins his hyperbolic praise of Plato by emphasizing 
the totality of Plato’s works; he treats them as all encompass-
ing, saying that the value of all books lies in the pages of the 
dialogues. He calls Plato the “exhausting generalizer” and 
implies that the history of thought since is merely footnotes 
to Plato, since “it is fair to credit the broadest generalizer with 
all the particulars deducible from his thesis” (289, emphasis 
added).2 My first task, then, is to clarify the nature of the “to-
tality” which Emerson found in Plato, what constitutes this 
act of generalization, and what Emerson sees as the work of 
“deducing” the particulars from his “thesis.” These words do 
not have the ordinary, mathematical meaning in Emerson’s 
use. Rather, I will show that Emerson makes much of the fact 
that Plato presented us not simply with a set of arguments or 
theories, but rather with the life and character of Socrates. Plato 
and Emerson are more concerned with the character, comport-
ment, and mode of life of the philosopher, not simply what 
theories she might subscribe to at any given time. It is the 
quality of life that is the proper ground on which to stand—as 
2 All quotations come from The Oxford Authors: Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. 
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the proper, literally, hypo-thesis, of the philosopher. Emerson 
seeks, through his style of writing, to remind us of the danger 
of keeping our work as philosophers and theorists sterilized of 
our concerns as living, politically involved human beings. 
Emerson makes this charge very clear to us: if we are to be 
readers of Plato, we must ourselves be philosophers. We will 
come to see that the very act of reading Plato or Emerson is 
the act of engaging in philosophical thinking, but this charge 
goes even beyond this; Emerson speaks of the life of Plato as 
accessible only in his works. He says, wonderfully, “Great 
geniuses have the shortest biographies. Their cousins can tell 
you nothing about them.” Emerson tells us of these geniuses 
that if we “would know their tastes and complexions, the most 
admiring of their readers most resembles them” (290-291). 
This is, again, a seemingly off-hand comment, but it speaks 
volumes. If we are to be among the “most admiring” of Plato’s 
readers, or of Emerson’s, we must live as they do, share their 
“tastes and complexions,” and model in our own lives the life 
of the genius. 
As we approach the rarified discussion of the “intellectual” 
aspects of Emerson’s take on Plato, we must keep in mind the 
goal of this thinking that makes Plato, even without extensive 
biography, the “representative of philosophy.” That is, we 
must keep in mind that the balance of thinking Emerson calls 
for leads to a balanced life. We will see that the reader of whom 
Emerson says in the essay History, “What Plato has thought, 
he may think” (113) is a reader who embraces the examined 
life, dedicates himself (with moderation) to the education of 
the polis as he and his teacher did, and not merely one who 
writes esoteric books on Plato’s “doctrine.” 
Returning to the question at hand, and the “generality” 
that Emerson praises in Plato, Emerson claims that Plato’s 
works have a “perpetual modernness,” the ability to speak to 
people of all eras. Emerson explains this by saying that Plato 
“was not misled by any thing short-lived or local, but abode by 
real and abiding traits” (291, emphasis added). He immediately 
follows this comment by himself posing the question of “How 
Plato came thus to be Europe, and philosophy,” indicating 
that the question of Plato’s “abiding” influence is a result of 
his connecting to himself “abiding” traits; this might seem 
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a rather common answer, but with Emerson, unlike many 
(other) religiously minded thinkers, this does not stand as 
an answer, but as the opening of a question. The “abiding”—not 
simply the eternal—aspects of existence are not the close of a 
question. We are not to presume what this word “abiding” 
means, but to find in Plato the opening of the question of that 
which abides. The doubling of the verb “to abide” further in-
dicates that this question of the “abiding traits” is precisely, as 
we indicated above, a question of where we live, or where we 
have always lived, or, where we should always strive to live. To 
put it clearly: We must be careful not to too readily consider 
the “religious” connotations of this term definitive. This is not 
to say that such a reading can be discounted; rather, we must 
note that the semantic excess, so characteristic of Emerson’s 
work, is certainly present here.3
Immediately after posing this question of Plato’s abiding 
influence, Emerson presents us with an odd paragraph. He 
makes a reference to the necessity of character in the one who 
abides in the abiding: he says it could not happen without 
a certain “soundness,” a “sincere and catholic” character, 
which is “able to honor, at the same time, the ideal, or law of 
the mind, and fate, or the order of nature” (292). I will simply 
note this double character here; the meaning of this duality, the 
relation between it and the general unity of Plato’s vision, and 
that the practical effects of this “at the same time” are central 
to my argument and will be fleshed-out below. 
Emerson then begins a strange and lengthy example as a 
further introduction to the essence of Plato’s genius. He speaks 
of a symmetry between the development of a nation and that 
of an individual. In both, he tells us, there is a movement, a 
teleological progress of development from “blind force” to 
“accuracy, to skill, to truth” (ibid.). He speaks of the progress 
from childhood to adulthood. At first, children can only ex-
press their desires and complaints with the force of inarticulate 
screams and cries; later in childhood they develop the ability 
to “speak and tell their want and reason of it” whence they 
become “gentle” (ibid.). This is true of adults as well:
 . . . whilst the perceptions are obtuse, men and women talk 
vehemently and superlatively, blunder and quarrel: their man-
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ners are full of desperation; their speech is full of oaths. As soon, 
with culture, things have cleared up a little, and they see them 
no longer in lumps and masses but accurately distributed, they 
desist from that weak vehemence and explain their meaning in 
detail. (292, emphasis added) 
He then attributes this ability to communicate to the very 
nature of human being, saying we would still be animals had 
the tongue not been “framed for articulation.” Emerson thus 
connects this development of the skill of communication, and 
the proper “perception,” “articulation”, “clarity,” and “distri-
bution” on which this communication is based, to the develop-
ment of one’s essential being as human. This development is 
further linked to development out of the “desperation” and 
the violent, oath-bearing shows of force which result from the 
reasons and nature of desire being unexamined and hidden to 
the agent. Further, he connects this ability to communicate to 
our lives in the polis, stating that once people meet someone 
who can “assist their volcanic estate, and good communication 
being established, they are thenceforward good citizens” (ibid., 
emphasis added).
Emerson then goes on to speak of this desperation as the 
source of the loneliness of “ardent young men and women” 
who “sigh and weep, write verses and walk alone,” feeling “I 
have never met with anyone who comprehends me” (ibid.). 
Emerson is building toward his statement of the essence of 
Plato’s genius. He will, on the next page, speak of this “accu-
racy and intelligence” in dividing and defining as this essence: 
“This dividing is philosophy,” he will say, so why this personal 
interlude? Why the reference to citizenship, desperate and ve-
hement oaths, and the weeping of poetically inclined youths? 
Why, we might also ask, do we meet citizens both good and 
bad, men hell-bent on fulfilling their pious duty, and desperate 
youths in the dialogues? 
There is no simple answer to this question—this decision 
on the part of the philosophers affects us differently in our 
personal lives and in our scholarly work, differently in our ac-
tivism in the community and in our teaching, as well as differ-
ently at different times in our lives. For our purposes here, this 
decision serves to frame the issue of the essence of philosophy 
as he will immediately reveal it: “to define.” What could be in 
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greater danger of seeming to sap the life-blood from thinking? 
For Plato’s part, we need only look at the traditional scholar-
ship to see that no other thinker is more in need of reviving. 
Ironically, no thinker than the one repeatedly accused of ignor-
ing this world where we live and die, placing truth in an eter-
nal “beyond,” has better explained through his ideas the im-
portance of how we choose to live our lives in the very world 
that he ostensibly ignored. Similarly, no thinker more than the 
one repeatedly accused of banishing poetry found it necessary 
to frame his ideas in so poetic a way. In his prose, Emerson 
reminds us of the literary dimensions of Plato’s work; he thereby 
reminds us of the way the “poetic” dimensions of texts can 
keep philosophy vibrant and firmly grounded in our lives. 
With these preliminary remarks out of the way, but kept in 
mind as framing the following discussion, we can now turn to 
Emerson’s account of the heart of Plato’s genius. 
II
“At last comes Plato, the distributor, who needs no barbaric 
paint, or tattoo, or whooping; for he can define” (292). Emer-
son introduces what he takes to be the heart of Plato’s thought 
by loosely quoting from the Phaedrus, “‘He shall be as a god 
to me, who can rightly divide and define’” (ibid.). Already 
in using this quote he has indicated the double character of 
philosophy—to divide as well as to define.4 “Philosophy is the 
account which the human mind gives to itself of the constitu-
tion of the world. Two cardinal facts lie forever at the base; the 
one and the two.—1. Unity, or Identity; and 2. Variety” (ibid., 
emphasis added). In this quote, in the word “forever,” we see 
that we are beginning to touch on the abiding—and it is not 
the eternal soul, but a structural fact lying at the base of either 
thinking or the world itself. The passage leaves it unclear: it 
could lie at the base of the “constitution of the world,” or at 
the base of philosophy, or perhaps the place where they meet. 
Emerson does not answer this question, wisely, and we will 
return to see how his work plays the poles of this quintessen-
tial philosophical problem against one another. 
Expounding on this duality, Emerson continues: “We unite 
4 We should note, of course, that to “define” also carries this duality. It can 
equally well mean to make distinctions and to gather the many into a one.
To define is 
the essence of 
philosophy.
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all things by perceiving the law which pervades them; by 
perceiving the superficial differences and the profound resem-
blances. But every mental act,—this very perception of identity 
or oneness, recognizes the difference of things. Oneness and 
otherness. It is impossible to speak or to think without embrac-
ing both” (293). With this statement, Emerson is revealing the 
double-character which he takes to be the essence of Plato’s 
work. With Plato, “In short, a balanced soul was born, percep-
tive of the two elements” (ibid.). He speaks of the power of 
division as lying in the province of Europe, and its practical 
sciences, and of the tendency toward unification as the virtue 
of Asian thought. Plato, of course, stands at the balance point 
between East and West: “The unity of Asia and the detail of 
Europe; the infinitude of the Asiatic soul and the defining, 
result-loving, machine-making, surface-seeking, opera-going 
Europe—Plato came to join, and, by contact, to enhance the 
energy of each. The excellence of Europe and Asia are in his 
brain” (293).
Emerson describes the movement toward unity with char-
acteristically transcendental language; he describes this move-
ment of thought as progressing towards “causes,” a tendency 
of thought to find “ones,” and to strive toward discovery of 
single causes of multiple appearances:
  The mind is urged to ask for one cause of many effects; then 
for the cause of that; and again the cause, diving still into the 
profound: self-assured that it shall arrive at an absolute and 
sufficient one,- a one that shall be all. “In the midst of the sun 
is the light, in the midst of the light is truth, and in the midst of 
truth is the imperishable being,” say the Vedas. All philosophy, 
of East and West, has the same centripetence. (293)
He uses language from the “Indian Scriptures,” including 
the Vedas and the Bhagavad-Gita to describe this movement, 
quoting from these texts for the length of an entire page; his 
intent, in pulling from texts which Plato would certainly have 
no access to, is to begin to flesh-out the universal nature of 
this tendency of thought toward unity: “In all nations there 
are minds which incline to dwell in the conception of the fun-
damental Unity” (293). His rhetoric here of the work toward 
Unity being the “same” in Plato, in Hindu texts, and indeed 
in all thought is performative of this tendency of thought to 
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“The Same, the Same: friend and foe are of one stuff; the 
ploughman, the plough and the furrow are of one stuff; and 
the stuff is such and so much that the variations of form are 
unimportant” (ibid.). Scholars might want to quibble with 
calling Plato’s to hen (The One), or to agathon (The Good) “the 
same” as Brahaman, despite the obvious similarities; but when 
working at the “level” at which the ploughman, the plough, 
and the furrow are all One, these scholarly distinctions are 
unimportant. The differences are washed away in the ascent 
to Unity in this temperament of thought—and as we will see, 
these differences are existentially unimportant to the insight 
Emerson is calling for. 
Of course, this tendency is balanced by its “opposite” 
tendency toward division, manyness: “If speculation tends 
thus to a terrific unity, in which all things are absorbed, ac-
tion tends directly backwards to diversity” (294). He char-
acterizes this turn to diversity as the province of action, and 
“Nature”: a term which obviously has enormous import for 
Emerson’s work. He continues: “The first [unity] is the course 
or gravitation of mind; the second [diversity] is the power of 
nature. Nature is the manifold. The unity absorbs, and melts 
or reduces. Nature opens and creates. These two principles 
reappear and interpenetrate all things, all thought; the one, 
the many” (ibid.). At this point we will just note the fact that it 
is in turning to action that the tendency of thought is driven to 
discover diversity and manyness; we will return to this point 
at length later. 
It is notable that Emerson describes the tendency toward 
unity as a tendency of “mind” as opposed to the tendency 
of nature, while at the same time stating that both tendencies 
interpenetrate “all thought.” This ambiguity brings to mind 
the structurally similar ambiguity we noted above with refer-
ence to the “two cardinal facts” which lie at the base of either 
philosophy, as the account of the world, or at the base of “the 
constitution of the world.”5 When trying to decide where Em-
erson places “mind” in relation to nature, we are faced with 
5 At the time of introducing this ambiguity, we noted that Emerson says 
these two cardinal facts lie “forever” at the base; to remind us now, this 
indicates that this ambiguity which we are encountering again is connected, by 
this “forever,” to whatever is “abiding” in life which Plato was able to contact, 
thus spawning his perennial influence and genius.
In Emerson's 
mind, unity 
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the “same” problem, here presented at a deeper level of com-
plexity, providing two “options for interpretation.” One option 
says that mind, tending toward unity, is in tension with its 
opposite, nature, which tends toward diversity. The other op-
tion says that both tendencies “interpenetrate thought.” Since 
thought has both tendencies within it, we must also speak of 
the realm of thought as containing both “cardinal facts,” thus 
the tendencies of “mind” and nature would now lie within the 
scope of “thought.” If this latter option of interpretation proves 
to be the case, we could then exclaim, quoting from “Experi-
ence”: “Thus inevitably does the universe wear our color, and 
every object fall successively into the subject itself. The subject 
exists, the subject enlarges; all things sooner or later fall into 
place. As I am, so I see; use what language we will, we can 
never say anything but what we are” (231). 
When this ambiguity first appeared above, it was simply a 
question of “idealism” vs. “realism”: i.e., does the dual-nature 
of thought come from the “constitution of the world,” or is it 
a product of our philosophy imposed upon the world? Here, 
however, there is another level to consider: The unity striven 
for by the one tendency of thought appears, in the first of the 
options of interpretation, to be counter to the world itself, i.e., 
to be an “ideal” imposed on the “real” manyness of phenom-
ena. In the latter option for interpretation both possibilities of the 
earlier dilemma are contained within “the subject.” 
That is, in the second option for interpretation of this sec-
ond ambiguity, both the conception of the “external” or “real” 
world as nature driving us toward diversity, and the conception 
of thought itself possessing this tendency “interpenetrate all 
thought.” As we quoted above, Emerson insists that “every 
mental act,—this very perception of identity or oneness, recognizes 
the difference of things. Oneness and otherness. It is impossible 
to speak or to think without embracing both” (293, emphasis 
added). Here, the two tendencies are not pictured as in opposi-
tion, but actually as creative of one another; that is, he claims 
that it is in the “very perception of identity” that we recognize 
difference. 
It appears, then, that there is no founding ambiguity be-
tween our philosophy and the “constitution of the world,” 
since they co-constitute thinking, and insisting on either as the 
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“proper basis” of the two cardinal facts is itself an “accident” 
of “temperament.” Emerson says: “Each student adheres, 
by temperament and by habit, to the first or to the second of 
these gods of the mind. By religion, he tends to unity; by intel-
lect, or by the senses, to the many” (294).6 The tender-minded 
temperament of Unity would insist that both the world and 
thought share this structure—that both lie firmly grounded 
in the structure of a “reality” which exceeds the distinction 
between mind and world. The hard-minded temperament 
of diversity insists that the mind seeks unities which are not 
present in the “constitution of the world,” imposes these on 
experience, breaking off the sharp edges of the square pegs of 
experience to fit it into the round hole of the ideal vision of the 
world. Both temperaments, without necessarily being aware of 
it, locate the very issue of grounding the “two cardinal facts” 
solidly in thought, interpenetrating it, being synonymous with 
it as its temperament.
This second option for interpretation seems to be the one 
most warranted by the text, since it is the option which would 
allow the text to be carefully written and the ambiguity to be 
intentional rather than careless. However, it does not allow 
us to get “behind” experience and locate the “cardinal facts” 
as either an imposition on the world or in the world itself, 
since to make this decision would demand that we step out-
side of thought to check this tendency against the structure 
of the world outside experience. Further, we know that, since, 
for Emerson, Plato is philosophy and Plato is the thinker who 
has found a balance between these tendencies, the apparent 
contradiction between these two modes/temperaments of 
thought must be false. Thus, the demand that we decide, in 
our philosophy, between “idealism” and “realism” (in the 
limited senses presented here, as locating the “two cardinal 
facts” solely in our philosophy or in the world, respectively) is 
a demand that we need not answer conclusively—they must 
remain “live” options. 
On what basis would we decide between “idealism” and 
“realism” as readings of Emerson? I hold that a careful read-
ing of the essays of Emerson, as well as of this essay in partic-
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ular, will find no solution that simply falls into either side of the 
aporetic “dilemma,” save the one that satisfies a given reader at 
a given time who, finding herself in the text, ends the reading 
when her own opinions are confirmed. His texts insist that we 
accept this ambiguity, that we learn to navigate and balance 
this “sliding scale” of consciousness; they insist that we consid-
er the dilemma, and do not too readily commit to either side, 
since to read this and other essays well demands that we hold 
both to be live options. Before we make any decision about this 
ambiguity, and its relation to the dialectic character of thought 
for Plato, and thus (on Emerson’s account) of philosophy, we 
have to attend more closely to this doubleness itself, and ask: 
what is the balance that Plato represents?
 
III
In order to deepen our understanding of this duality, and 
the dialectic that Emerson and Plato take to be central to phi-
losophy and to life, we will turn away from Emerson’s explicit 
work on Plato, and attend to the dialectical structure that ap-
pears in several of his essays, especially “History.” 
“History” begins boldly: “There is one mind common to 
all individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same and to 
all of the same. . . What Plato has thought, he may think; what 
a saint has felt, he may feel; what at any time has be-fallen 
any man, he can understand” (113). This is a hyperbolic claim 
which clearly invites skepticism. Is it really possible to think 
what Plato has thought? Certainly I will never know the suffer-
ing of a saint. Does Emerson, then, completely discount what 
we experience as the basis of what we can know, what we can 
feel? Certainly our era, society, and upbringing play some role 
that problematizes this access to the “universal mind.” In these 
opening lines Emerson makes an unbelievably bold claim, 
which seems startlingly naïve.
However, by the second-to-last page of the essay, we find 
Emerson saying, 
A mind might ponder its thought for ages, and not gain so 
much self-knowledge as the passion of love shall teach it in 
a day. Who knows himself before he has been thrilled with 
indignation at an outrage, or has heard an eloquent tongue, or 
has shared the throb of thousands in a national exultation or 
alarm? No man can antedate his experience, or guess what faculty 
To label 







nature of his 
thought.
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or feeling a new object shall unlock, any more than he can 
draw to-day the face of a person whom he shall see to-morrow 
for the first time. (128, emphasis added) 
What has happened between these two moments in the 
essay? We do not have the time to go into a careful analysis of 
the text, but upon encountering this line the reader is struck 
with the stark contrast to the first lines. In returning to the 
opening of the essay, one finds hints to this other “pole” of 
Emerson’s presentation of our thoughtful relation to history 
throughout the essay. This is certainly a carefully crafted du-
ality and ambiguity. It is impossible to ignore either pole in 
reading the essay, and as such, the reader is called into a space of 
thinking bordered on one side by the absolute difference between all 
people, and on the other by what makes us one. The essay works 
dialectically. 
Emerson has traditionally been deemed a “poet” rather 
than a “philosopher”—one finds his essays in the library next 
to Butler and Yeats, not James, Hegel, or Plato.7 It begins to be 
clear why more traditionally tough-minded thinkers find this 
ambiguity exasperating. However, a careful reader is on guard 
against frustration. One should not expect Emerson to settle 
arguments if one takes his equation of Plato with philosophy 
as a guide. The dialogues force one to consider the wealth of 
a text not simply in the proofs it offers or the arguments it 
makes, but also in the questions that it poses. 
Consider this passage from Emerson and the Conduct of Life 
by David Robinson: “The tensions in Emerson’s thought are 
apparent when one attempts to specify his intellectual position 
7 Consider this passage from Doug Anderson’s Philosophy Americana: 
Making Philosophy at Home in American Culture (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2006): “In an essay in 1876 O. B. Frothingham maintained: ‘Mr. Emerson’s 
place is among poetic, not philosophic minds.  He belongs to the order of 
imaginative men. The imagination is his organ.’ A bit later George Edward 
Woodberry asserted that ‘Emerson, as has been said, was fundamentally a 
poet with an imperfect faculty of expression.’ And more recently Charles 
Fiedelson, Jr., while acknowledging Emerson’s attempt at philosophy, argues 
that Emerson’s ‘theory has weight chiefly as a literary program . . . .’ Insofar 
as these merely describe Emerson’s writing, they are of course in part true. 
Emerson did intend to argue for the role of the poetic in ascertaining and 
disseminating wisdom and character as is clearly evidenced in ‘The Poet.’ 
However, he did not mean that mere poetry would suffice; Emerson shared 
with Plato a concern for the poet’s ignorance of her own wisdom. . .” (118).
Emerson is 
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in a given essay, but to write such an essay off as contradictory 
misses a larger value, its ability to take the reader into an ex-
emplary act of thinking.”8 It is, as should be clear by now, the 
purpose of this paper to understand the abiding structure of 
any “act of thinking” which Emerson would call “philosophi-
cal,” and into which he would seek to draw his readers.
Returning to “History,” we find that after Emerson insists 
that experience marks the limits of what a person can think 
(thereby fully explicating the dialectic tension in the essay) 
Emerson writes: “Let it suffice that in light of these two facts, 
namely, that the mind is One, and that nature is its correlative, 
history is to be read and written” (129, emphasis added). We 
saw above, in connection with the essay on Plato, the difficul-
ties present in deciding what might be meant here by “correla-
tive.” But what matters for our purposes here is that we get 
a sense for the productive nature of this unresolved tension. 
Immediately after invoking these two facts here, Emerson 
says that we are concerned with how we shall read and write 
history. One is certainly reminded of Nietzsche’s work On the 
Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life, when Emerson 
places the focus of our attention to history on its effects on life 
8 David Robinson, Emerson and the Conduct of Life: Pragmatism and Ethical 
Purpose in the Later Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 12. 
Robinson and Anderson are certainly not alone in recognizing the dialectical 
character of Emerson’s essays. The classic example of the identification of the 
importance of dialectic for Emerson’s prose style was made by W. T. Harris 
in 1884: “Emerson has furnished us with many very wonderful examples of 
dialectic treatment of his subject. . . . The object of his writing was to present 
truth, and produce insight, and not to make proselytes” (“The Dialectic Unity 
in Emerson’s Prose,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 2 [April, 
1884], 196). See Evan Carton, The Rhetoric of American Romance: Dialectic and 
Identity in Emerson, Dickinson, Poe, and Hawthorne (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins 
University Press, 1985). Carton argues that Emerson, in his prose, creates what 
he calls an “Emersonian double-consciousness,” by incorporating “affirmation 
and denial” in order to subvert any simple access to its meaning (25). His 
work thus “shadows its own claims with critical counterclaims” (26). See also 
Steven Railton, “Seeing & Saying: The Dialectic of Emerson’s Eloquence,” 
in Emerson and His Legacy: Essays in Honor of Quentin Anderson, ed. Stephen 
Donadio (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); R. A. Yoder, 
“Emerson’s Dialectic,” Criticism, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1969), 313-328; Walter Blair 
and Clarence Faust, “Emerson’s Literary Method,” Modern Philology 42 (1944), 
79-95; Paul Sherman, Emerson’s Angle of Vision (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1952), 112-19; Gustaaf van Cromphout, “Emerson and the 
Dialectics of History,” PMLA, Vol. 91, No. 1 (January 1976), 54-65, et al.
Emerson’s 
ambiguity 
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as he continues:
  Thus in all ways does the soul concentrate and reproduce 
its treasures for each pupil. He, too, shall pass through the 
whole cycle of experience. He shall collect into a focus the 
rays of nature. History no longer shall be a dull book. It shall 
walk incarnate in every just and wise man. You shall not tell me 
by languages and titles a catalogue of the volumes you have 
read. You shall make me feel what periods you have lived. A 
man shall be the Temple of Fame. He shall walk, as the poets 
have described that goddess, in a robe painted all over with 
wonderful events and experiences. (129, emphasis added)
With this beautiful, grandiloquent language Emerson be-
gins to bring his essay to a close. We can see why this would 
be off-putting to the traditional philosophical mind, especially 
as it has appeared in America. 
To modern readers there seems to be something excessive 
in this claim. This is intentional, as Emerson indicates, when 
he brilliantly continues, opening the next paragraph: “Is there 
somewhat overweening in this claim? Then I reject all I have 
written, for what is the use of pretending to know what we 
know not? But it is the fault of our rhetoric that we cannot strongly 
state one fact without seeming to belie some other” (129, empha-
sis added). Here, we begin to see the real spirit behind these 
grand turns of phrase, and the way we can begin to under-
stand how Emerson can present conflicting viewpoints, not 
just as pedagogical tools, but because he really holds them as valu-
able ways to approach the world and the self. As he says in the es-
say “Self-Reliance”: “The other terror that scares us from self-
trust is our consistency; a reverence for our past act or word, 
because the eyes of others have no other data for computing 
our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath to disappoint 
them” (136, emphasis added). How can we hold conflicting 
opinions? How can Emerson claim (seemingly) contradictory 
truths in different essays, and even within the same essay, and 
even as the structural basis of a single essay, and not appear to us 
to be incapable of the intellectual subtlety necessary to unravel 
the ambiguity into a clear formulation? As this quote indi-
cates, he introduces the variable of time; it is our past acts that 
we feel we must hold to, and which then stifles our creativity, 
and our growth:
  But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why 
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drag about this corpse of your memory, lest you contradict 
somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? Sup-
pose you should contradict yourself; what then? It seems to be 
a rule of wisdom never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely 
even in acts of pure memory, but to bring the past for judgment 
into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day. In 
your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity: yet 
when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart 
and life, though they should clothe God with shape and color. 
Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, 
and flee. (Self-Reliance, 136)
This passage is, of course, immediately followed by one of 
the most famous from Emerson’s work: 
  A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored 
by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consis-
tency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well 
concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what 
you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what 
to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict 
every thing you said to-day.‘Ah, so you shall be sure to be 
misunderstood.’Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Py-
thagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and 
Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every 
pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be 
misunderstood. (Self-Reliance, 137)
Thus the very structure of his essays comes to mirror the 
multiplicity of opinion that Emerson feels is necessary to live 
well. To live well is a matter that takes time—in fact it takes 
no less time than the span of a life, and there is no short-cut; 
in that time, there is no reason to expect that one set of prin-
ciples will serve us to live well for that entire span.9 The same 
is certainly true of Plato; in the Republic, Glaucon says that the 
proper “measure” for listening to philosophy “is a whole life” 
(450b). One might go further, in fact, and add that for Emerson 
and Plato it is precisely seeking a simple formulation of some 
one eternal set of rules or Truths that stifles our lives and our 
thinking. Why should the truths of the world,concerning what 
beliefs and values are necessary for life, not contradict? Why 
9 Yoder argues that to enter into Emerson’s “inner life” is to follow “the 
conflicts and changes in his thinking.” Emerson’s “inner process tells us 
something important about the outer product, the works Emerson published 
during his life. It is easier now, to understand why the essays do not submit to 
paraphrase or summary: the vitality of the inner life shows more clearly that 
ordinary logic would not serve Emerson’s purpose. . .” (1969, 313).
For Emerson, 
as for Plato, to 
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expect the values that guide us today to last a lifetime? Em-
erson looks at the world, looks at the span of life, and finds 
superfluity. No one articulation can hope to capture the truths 
of the Spirit. If it is the case that this “greatness” that Emerson 
speaks of is the ability to balance seeming contradictions, 
then living with “both” aspects is a precondition to seeing the 
abiding basis in which they no longer appear to “belie” one 
another, to simply negate the other without remainder. For 
Emerson, this is, as quoted above, a “fault of our rhetoric.” 
Again, Emerson finds the abiding not in what is thought, 
but in the structure and movement of thought—in its dual 
nature, which causes not stasis, but the dynamic movement 
between unity and diversity that forms, in a palintropos harmo-
nia, the very abiding, dialectical essence of thought. It is this 
understanding of the “abiding” that informs his literary style, 
and the dialectic structure of the essays. 
Conclusion
I have shown above that, for Emerson, the essence of phi-
losophy as seen in Plato is the ability to “abide in the abiding.” 
This abiding element is discovered not in the composition of 
the soul, nor in some simply “metaphysical” truth lying “in 
the heavens or beneath the earth”; rather, the abiding is found 
in what lies “forever at the base” of thinking and of the world, 
in their “correlation” and interpenetration. This abiding basis 
is double in nature, and has a tense, oppositional structure—
with truth seeming to most minds to appear on one side or the 
other, depending upon the temperament of the person declar-
ing: “true!” Plato’s genius was in seeing both aspects, despite 
apparent contradiction, in their workings within “every men-
tal act.”
The genius of Plato’s work is thus revealed in the literary 
dimensions of the dialogue structure, by which Plato draws 
the reader into a participation in the movement and life of 
thinking. It is this ability to inspire and engage in the move-
ments of thought that Emerson so admired in The Philosopher, 
and which he sought to mimic in his own literary works. Thus, 
we can see that the name “Plato,” as it appears in the essays, 










96 • Volume XXIX, Nos. 1 and 2, 2016 Jesse Bailey
transcendent (though we are not surprised to find Emerson, 
as a “transcendentalist,” marking the path to Unity frequently 
and with great enthusiasm). It was Plato who most symbolizes 
the understanding of the connection between the written word, 
philosophy, and life. Specifically, I have shown how Emerson’s 
prose style flows from his understanding of the temporality of 
human life. Plato and Emerson wanted to write for the ages, 
for people of different levels of sophistication and at differ-
ent stages of life. Thus, their work cannot simply be taken as 
“true” propositions for us to memorize; they sought to draw us 
into a space of thinking marked by the dual nature of the abid-
ing basis of thought and life. This is the genius that marks the 
connection between the literary and philosophical dimensions 
of these two thinkers.
Genius of 
Emerson and 
Plato found in 
their dialogic 
style inviting 
the reader to 
participate in 
thinking.
